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ABSTRACT
We model a firm’s choice as to the age composition of dismissed workers for different
assumptions about the level of firing costs. We find that with high firing costs (not to
mention rising ones), firms will be inclined to fire younger workers while with low
costs of firing, the older workers are at risk. Since with high firing costs old workers
are better protected against layoffs, an ageing population has the effect of making
employment-protection legislation more stringent.
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1Young workers are much more likely to be unemployed than their more mature
counterparts. In France, Italy and Spain the unemployment rate for workers under the
age of 20 has been around 3-5 times as high as for those aged 25-54 (OECD
Employment Outlook, 1996). This observation warrants an explanation for its own
sake. Moreover, if we can find reasons for such differences, the possibility arises that
changes in the age structure of the population affect the aggregate unemployment rate.
The questions that come to mind include: How do firms reach a decision as to
whether to hire (fire) a young or a mature worker? How do labour-market institutions
such as employment protection affect this choice? And, most importantly, how do
changes in the age composition of the labour force affect aggregate outcomes such as
the rate of employment and unemployment? In this paper we provide microeconomic
foundations to address these issues. We find that employment protection is much more
likely to protect the more mature workers. Employment-protection legislation is hence
likely to raise the relative unemployment rates among the young. Moreover, the age
composition of the labour force is an exogenous determinant of the stringency of any
employment-protection legislation.
The low employment-to-population ratios in countries with severe firing
restrictions (i.e. France, Italy and Spain) are mainly due to low participation rates of
teenagers and women (Nickell (1998). High unemployment rates among prime-aged
males are not responsible for this outcome. Thus the impact of such restrictions can be
found both in the composition of those nonactive and in the level of employment. To
analyse this relationship further we estimated the following equations separately for
men and women for a cross section of 18 OECD countries;1
εγβα +++= eplnn oy 000
εγβα +++= epluu oy 111
where ny and uy are the employment/population ratio and the unemployment rate of
young workers (15-19/20-24 years of age) and no and uo are the corresponding figures
for workers aged between 25-54 years. The variable epl denotes a measure of
employment protection (epl) taken from Nickell (1998). The results follow in Table 1
for the year 1994.
2Table 1. The effect of employment protection on youth employment and
unemployment
 Men Women
αi βi γi αi βi γi
u (15-19) 3.87
(0.9)
1.50
(3.6)
0.42
(1.4)
0.45
(0.1)
1.81
(4.5)
0.46
(1.2)
u (20-24) 1.31
(0.5)
1.25
(4.7)
0.53
(2.9)
-1.30
(0.5)
1.48
(5.9)
0.42
(1.7)
n (15-19) 60.98
(1.2)
-0.15
(0.2)
-1.79
(3.8)
31.59
(1.6)
0.23
(0.9)
-1.84
(3.8)
n (20-24) 0.56
(0.0)
0.87
(2.5)
-1.27
(4.8)
63.42
(3.6)
0.12
(0.5)
-1.51
(3.4)
Data source: Employment Outlook, 1996. t-ratios in parentheses.
The effect of epl on the employment/population ratio is very significant for all four
groups. The effect on unemployment is less significant but significant at the 5% level
for men aged 20-24 and at the 10% level for women in the same age group. We
conclude that our measure of employment protection appears to be negatively
correlated with employment and positively correlated with unemployment in our
sample.
Turning to possible explanations for our empirical observations, Lazear and
Freeman (1997) find that in a downturn the young (and also the very old) workers
should be the first to be laid off. The young have not been given any firm-specific
skills while the old’s productivity may have declined relative to their wage. These
groups should thus have a higher rate of transition from employment to
unemployment than do prime-age workers. The interaction with firing costs is not
considered. Layard et al. (1991) find the wage-push factor to be stronger for young
workers due to higher turnover and, as a result, their unemployment rate becomes
higher. This is because high turnover makes the prospect of unemployment spells less
threatening which then makes unions more aggressive. Again, employment protection
legislation is not a part of the story.
                                                                                                                                           
1 The countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S.
3Other reasons for age discrimination in firing involve the direct and indirect
effect of pension schemes. Most pension schemes are defined-benefit schemes, which
implies that the benefits increase more rapidly as the age of retirement approaches
since they are based on final salary at retirement. This makes employers want to lay
off workers with a long tenure. A possible offsetting effect can be found in Orszag et
al. (1999). Here old workers have a higher effort level because they have more to lose
in the event of a dismissal.
In our model we show how the level of firing costs is important for the (age)
structure of unemployment. We assume for simplicity that productivity is independent
of age. Workers only differ in their expected remaining tenure and firms take this into
account when making hiring and firing decisions. Under these conditions the decision
whom to fire first in a downturn depends on the level of firing costs as shown in our
model.
We model the hiring and also the firing decision as an intertemporal
investment decision. The (sunk) costs of hiring are associated with teaching the
worker firm-specific skills while the (sunk) firing costs could be state-mandated
redundancy payments. These can be either fixed for all workers or rising in tenure. We
use a real-options approach from investment theory to answer these questions.
Our methodological approach
The option-valuation approach to investment has been popular since the seminal
papers of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) on the pricing of stock
options. These methods of valuing stocks can be easily applied to real options, which
denote the option-like characteristics of investment opportunities. The decision to
invest (or the decision to exercise real options) becomes important with the existence
of uncertainty and sunk costs. McDonald and Siegel (1986) show that the required rate
of return on investment in many large industrial projects can be more than doubled by
moderate amounts of uncertainty when the investment project is at least in partly
irreversible.2
In most cases it is assumed that the real options are infinitely livedthe real-
life investment opportunities are infinitely lived and never valueless (e.g. McDonald
                                                
2 For an introduction, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
4and Siegel; 1984, 1986). However, some research deals with the non-perpetual real
options (e.g. Paddock, Siegel and Smith (1988)). But it has been claimed that it is
often not possible to solve such non-perpetual options analytically, making numerical
methods essential.3 Generally speaking, it is hard to solve completely for free-
boundary time-dependent real options. Part of reason is that the function of time-
dependent options has a complicated shape, which might need several analytical
functions to simulate with. We will show in the case of real options that approximate
analytical solutions can exist.4 The approximate solutions of non-perpetual real
options should share the same composite components as perpetual real options. The
partial differential equation of non-perpetual real options can then be transformed into
a Convection-Diffusion problem,5 which can be solved for analytically using standard
techniques of partial differential equations.
In the following section we will describe the profit-maximisation problem and
the underlying stochastic process. We then go on in Sections II and III to describe the
hiring- and firing thresholds when they are calculated separately. In Section IV we
generalise and calculate the two thresholds simultaneously. Finally, in Section V we
discuss the macroeconomic implications.
I. Basic Framework
There is only one sector in our economy that uses labour as an input to produce a
homogenous good. Since our focus is on labour demand, real wages are assumed fixed
and their determination is not described. The source of uncertainty is stochastic
productivity.
Current profits, measured in units of output, are defined as follows in the
absence of firing,
                                                
3 One of the reasons for the non-existence of analytical solutions is that such options are similar to
American stock options that can be exercised at any time up to the expiration date. It is well-known that
American stock options can only be solved for using analytical approximations or numerical methods
such as finite-difference methods. American call options with lump-sum dividends are an exception
though in that their terminal and boundary conditions differ (see Roll, 1977; Geske, 1979; Whaley,
1981). The possible analytical solutions to partial differential equations vary greatly when boundary-
and terminal (and/or initial) conditions change. Changes in such conditions can result in the non-
existence of analytical solutions. The method used here is most similar to Barone-Adesi and Whaley
(1987).
4 ‘Approximate’ is in a sense that the solutions are not complete, but still a good proxy for real
solutions, compared with the results from explicit finite difference method in the Appendix D.
5 In physics, convection is the movement of the substance by the movement of the medium. Combined
with a diffusion problem, it will be like the diffusion of a moving wave.
5( ) ,, ttttt wNNgNg −=Π θ          0<θ<1,                     (1)
where N denotes the number of employed workers, w is the real wage and g is a
measure of productivity.
It is assumed that each worker has a working life of T years. To simplify the
model, we assume that workers die immediately after they retire and that all workers
have the same productivity independent of their age. Moreover, we assume that both
current and potential employers can observe a worker’s age.
It is assumed that g follows a geometric Brownian motion
;gdzgdsdg σ+η=                                               (2)
where z is a Wiener process; dsdz ε=  since ε  is a normally distributed random
variable with mean zero and a standard deviation of unity. Here η  is the drift
parameter (the expected growth rate of labour productivity) and σ  the variance
parameter. It is assumed that this average quit rate per unit time is constant over time
and equal to λ . The probability that a given worker will quit over the interval ds  is
therefore equal toλds .
The firm’s expected marginal value of an employee without any firing and/or
hiring is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )−λ+ρ−−=≡
T
t
ts
st dsewYTtYvTtYv ;,;, ,                        (3)
where ρ  denotes the real interest rate, v is the (intertemporal) marginal value of
workers, Y g Ns s s=
−θ θ 1  represents the marginal product of labour at time s, and wYs −
denotes instantaneous marginal profits at time s. Equation (3) is similar to the
expressions in Bentolila and Bertola (1990) except each marginal worker can only
work for the firm for a maximum of T periods.6
s'oˆIt  Lemma gives the following process for marginal labour productivity,
YdzYdsdY Y σ+η= ,                                             (4)
where ( )θ−λ+η=η 1Y .
Now consider the effect of the firing and hiring costs on firms’ profits decisions.
When the marginal profit of a worker is greater than the hiring cost, the firm starts to
                                                
6  T is the maximum possible tenure since workers might quit or get fired earlier.
6hire new workers; when the negative of the marginal profit value of a worker is higher
than the firing cost, the firm starts to fire workers. Thus, the process of sY  or ( )tYv ,
becomes an optional stopping problem or regulated Itô process. The firm will hire a
marginal worker if
( ) HTtYv h ≥;,                                             (5.1)
and fire a marginal worker if
( ) FTtYv f ≥− ;, ,                                           (5.2)
where H and F represent hiring and firing costs respectively, hT  denotes T for the
worker that the firm hires and fT  for the worker that the firm fires. hT  is different
from fT  since hiring and firing decisions cannot happen at the same time.
A standard technique for solving the above dynamic optimisation problem is
Bellman’s Principle of Optimality (Bellman, 1957). Using s'oˆIt  Lemma, we get the
following Bellman equation for the marginal value of the firm's stock of workers;
( )TtYvv ;,≡ , in the continuation region where the values of future hires and fires are
not taken into account,
( ) tYYYY vvYYvwYv +σ+η+−=λ+ρ 222
1 .                            (6)
This partial differential equation relates the value of workers to the value of the
stochastic variable Y at each point in time.
Equation (6) is different from the expressions in Bentolila and Bertola (1990)
and many others. In their setup, the time horizon in equation (4) is set from zero when
equation (6) is derived, and thus the function v does not depend on time. Under these
conditions, equation (6) becomes a second-order ordinary differential equation in Y.
As a result, the option values of hiring and firing workers become independent of
time. It follows that the options for hires and/or fires do not approach zero when
workers age. One of the objectives of this paper is to correct for this and show how
important implications arise.
The problem now is to solve for v, which is the value of employing a marginal
worker. The solution for v consists of the particular integral and the complementary
function. A convenient particular solution, Pv , for (6) is
,bwaYv P −=                                                  (7)
7where ( ) ( )( ) ( )YTt YY eea η−λ+ρ−= η−λ+ρ−η−λ+ρ− , ( ) ( )( ) ( )λ+ρ−= λ+ρ−λ+ρ− Tt eeb  and it is
assumed that the denominator of the parameter a is positive.
The firm takes into account the option value of hiring in the future. There is
also the option to fire the worker once he is employed. The two option values are
measured by the complementary (or homogenous) solutions to (6). Now only focusing
on the homogenous part of equation (6) and letting vG  be the value of the marginal
option, we get
( ) GtGYYGYYG vvYYvv +σ+η=λ+ρ 222
1 .                               (8)
The general solutions of (8) are equal to the value of the options to hire or fire
the marginal worker. When Y approaches zero, the value of the option to hire, GHv , has
to go to zero. Similarly, the firing options, GFv , is equal to zero when Y goes to
infinity. Thus, the general solutions for the hiring and firing options have to satisfy the
following boundary conditions respectively,
( ) 0;,lim
0
=
→
TtYvG
Y
 for the hiring option,                               (9.1)
( ) 0;,lim =
∞→
TtYvG
Y
 for the firing option.                               (9.2)
A special case of equation (8) is when time is equal to zero (t=0) and workers live
forever (T=∞). Thus, the term Gtv  in equation (8) disappears and the values of the
hiring- and firing options are (see the Appendix A)
1
10
βYAv H =  for hiring option,                                 (10.1)
2
20
βYAv F =  for firing option.                                 (10.2)
The unknown parameters of 1A  and 2A  are determined by the value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions and β is determined by equation (11). [see Appendix A]
( ) ( ) 01
2
1 2
=λ+ρ−βη+−ββσ Y .                                   (11)
The general solutions to (8) are then given by the following equations (see Appendix
B):
( ) ( )11 1, dNYAtYvGH β= ,                                      (12)
( ) ( )22 2, dNYAtYvGF −= β ,                                   (13)
where A1 , A2 are unknown parameters,
8( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
+
+




−−+
=
σ
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ 2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1ln
,
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
+
+




−−−
=
σ
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1ln
,
 where Y  is hiring costs or firing costs
( ) ,
2
1 22
∞−
ϖ− ϖ
π
=
d
dedN  ( ) 10 ≤≤ dN
is the cumulative distribution function for the normal distribution.
Looking at the hiring- and firing options we find two separate cases:
Case 1: T → ∞
It is easy to show that as T approaches infinity (workers live forever), the cumulative
distribution functions of ( )1dN  and ( )2dN −  become unity. This reduces the firing
and hiring options to the case of perpetual options.
Case 2:  T → 0
If Yln >0, then ( )1dN =1 and ( )2dN − =0 as T approaches zero. If marginal
profitability is high enough, firms mainly focus on the hiring decision. The firing
option approaches zero because this marginal worker will retire very soon.
If Yln <0, then ( )1dN =0 and ( )2dN − =1 as T approaches zero. If marginal
profitability is low, firms mainly consider the firing decision. Since the marginal
worker’s T is very small when he/she gets fired, the possibility of re-hiring this worker
is almost zero. Therefore, the hiring option approaches zero.7
                                                
7 Note that the options of hiring and firing approach zero automatically if T approaches zero since the
marginal profits for hiring/firing would be zero in this situation.
9II. The Hiring- and the Firing Decisions
The decision as to hire or fire a worker depends on his value as given by equations
(7)-(13) and also on the direct costs of hiring and firing. We assume that the cost of
firing takes the form of mandatory redundancy payments. The definition of the firing-
and hiring barriers; YF and YH, are given by the value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions:
Value-matching conditions
( ) ( )12 ,;,,;, ATtYvHATtYvbwaY hHGHhHGFH +=+− ,             (14)
( ) ( ) ( )21 ,;,,;, ATtYvFATtYvbwaY fFGFhFGHF +=+−− .            (15)
The left-hand side of (14) has the marginal benefit of hiring which includes the
acquired firing option. The right-hand side has the marginal cost of hiring, which
includes the sacrificed hiring option. Similarly for equation (15), the left-had side has
the marginal benefit and the right-hand side the marginal cost of firing. In our
numerical solutions below, we will only include the sacrificed firing option as part of
the cost of firing; we will not include the acquired hiring option as a benefit of firing.
The reason is that firing one worker is not going to alter a firm’s chances at filling a
vacancy in the future if there are many firms in the market or if there are many
unemployed people to start with.
The smooth-pasting conditions follow.
Smooth-pasting conditions
( ) ( )
0
,;,,;, 12
=
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
+
H
h
H
G
H
H
h
H
G
F
Y
ATtYv
Y
ATtYva ,                (16)
( ) ( )
0
,;,,;, 12
=
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
+
H
h
F
G
H
F
f
F
G
F
Y
ATtYv
Y
ATtYva ,               (17)
where8
( ) ( )111111 11 dNYAdNYAY
v
Y
G
H β−β +β=
∂
∂
,                         (18)
                                                
8 For derivation of (20) and (21), see Appendix C.
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( ) ( )222122 22 dNYAdNYAY
v
Y
G
F
−+−β=
∂
∂ β−β ,                    (19)
( )
( )[ ]
( )
( )tTY
edN
tT
tTY
Y
−
=
−
−+−
πσ
σ
ασ
2
2
22
2
ln
1 ,                                      (20)
( )
( )[ ]
( )
( )tTY
edN
tT
tTY
Y
−
−=−
−
−+−−
πσ
σ
ασ
2
2
22
2
ln
2 ,                                (21)
and ( )2
2
2
2
2
1
σ
λρ
σ
η
α
+
+




−=
Y . Equations (14), (15), (16) and (17) are non-linear
systematic equations with four unknown parameters [ 21  and , , , AAYY FH ] and can be
solved for numerically.
III. Firing Thresholds under Alternative Institutional Setups
We will now calculate the firing thresholds on the basis of equation (15) and (17)
without taking into account the hiring thresholds. Thus, (15) and (17) become
( ) ( )2,;, ATtYvFbwaY fFGFF +=−− ,                             (15.1)
( )
0
,;, 2
=
∂
∂
+
F
f
F
G
F
Y
ATtYva ,                                (17.1)
We then check the robustness of our results in Section IV for the general case when
both the hiring- and the firing thresholds are calculated simultaneously.
We start with our baseline, which has a fixed level of firing costs that is
independent of age. This is shown in Figure 1 below. Please see the Appendix D for
the comparison of analytical approximations with explicit finite difference method.
As the firing costs rise, the firm becomes more inclined to fire the younger
among its workers. The reason is simple: part of the cost of firing a worker is the
sacrificed option of doing so in the future. This was shown in equation (15). This
firing option is decreasing in both the level of the firing costs and in the worker’s age.
For low levels of firing costs, the marginal cost of firing a young person is much
higher than the cost of firing an older one for this reason. But at high firing costs, the
difference is much smaller as the firing option is always very lowboth for the young
and the old worker. However, the marginal benefit of firing the young worker is
always higherthat is for all levels of firing costsbecause of his longer remaining
11
tenure. It follows that the firm would choose to fire the young worker first if firing
costs are highthe value of the firing option lowbut at low firing costs it may
choose to fire the older worker first since the marginal cost of doing so is much lower.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Age
F=0.2
F=2
F=5
Figure 1.The effect of age on firing thresholds with different firing costs. Age is equal to
(65-T_f). Other parameters: σ=0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, λ=0.05, w=1, and t=0.
It follows from the nature of the stochastic process for productivity shown in
equation (2) that the firm does not expect productivity to recover. Therefore, when a
young worker is fired the firm is reducing its losses for a much longer period of time
than when the older workers are fired. With high firing costs, this is the only
difference between the old and the young and the young workers are the first to be
fired. However with low firing costs, the firm values the option to be able to fire the
workers at a later date when more information about the evolution of productivity is
available. This option is worth more in the case of the young workers and can make
the firm fire the older ones first.
Note the difference between our setup and that of Lazear and Freeman (1997).
They claim that it is optimal to fire the younger workers because they are less
productive since the (firm-specific) skill accumulation has not been completed. We
find that they should also, if there are significant costs of firing, be the first to go even
if their productivity is no lower than that of older workers. Firing a young worker
whose productivity is lower than wages is more profitable than firing an older worker
since his expected tenure is longer. Note also, that these results do not depend on
firing costs rising over tenure. All that is needed is a high and fixed level of firing
costs.
We now turn to more realistic scenarios. In Figure 2 we introduce a fixed-term
contract at the beginning of employment followed by a permanent contract during
12
which redundancy payments are rising in tenure. There is an initial three-year
probationary period during which the worker can be fired at no costs. The cost of
firing is then an increasing function of tenure. For the flattest firing-cost schedule we
find that the old are likely to be fired first. However, as the schedule becomes steeper,
the firm resorts to firing younger workers. We conclude that high (as in Figure 1) and
rising (as in Figure 2) firing costs affect the age composition of layoffs in a similar
manner.
0,4
0,45
0,5
0,55
0,6
0,65
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Age
Fi
rin
g 
th
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sh
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ds
F=w(ages-20)/96 F=w(ages-20)/48
F=w(ages-20)/24
Figure 2.The effect of age on firing thresholds with different firing costs and a three-period
probationary period. Age is equal to (65-T_f). Other parameters: σ=0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7,
η=0.02, λ=0.05, w=1, and t=0.
A discontinuity in the relationship between tenure and firing costs following the
completion of the probationary period does not change the results. This is shown in
Figure 3. There is a jump in the level of firing costs from zero to a positive number
once the probationary period has been completed.
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F =w [(ages-20 )/48+0 .25 ]
F =w [(ages-20 )/24+0 .25 ]
Figure 3.The effect of age on firing thresholds with different firing costs and a 3 period
probationary period. Age is equal to (65-T_f). Other parameters: σ=0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7,
η=0.02, λ=0.05, w=1, and t=0.
By comparing Figures 1-3 we find that rising firing costs (such as in Figures 2
and 3) have a bigger effect on the young than a fixed but high level of firing costs
Figure 1). Clearly the combination of the twohigh firing costs which are rising in
tenurewould be the worst combination from the perspective of the young workers.
IV. Hiring Thresholds in the Two-threshold Case
In order to check the robustness of our results, we calculate the hiring and the firing
thresholds for a fixed level of firing costs in the two-threshold case when both the
hiring- and the firing thresholds are calculated simultaneously. The results are in
Figure 4 below.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
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0.7
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0.9
Ages
F=0.2
F=2
F=5
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
Ages
F=0.2F=2
F=5
Figure 4.The effect of age on the hiring- and firing thresholds with different firing costs.
Ages are equal to (65-T_f). Other parameters: σ=0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, λ=0.05, w=1,
and t=0.
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This figure shows that in this general case, firing thresholds are very similar to the
one-barrier case except for a change in the absolute value. Furthermore we find that
firms always hire younger workers first no matter what level the firing costs are.
V. Macroeconomic implications
We have found that with firing costs (or firing costs that are rising in tenure) provide
more protection to the older workers than to the younger ones.  It follows that the age
structure of the population affects the tightness of employment-protection legislation:
the ageing of the workforce has the same effect on the firing thresholds as an increase
in the firing costs themselves. This has two implications.
First, when assessing the nature of a country’s labour-market institutions one
has to normalise for the age structure of the labour force. Two countries with similar
legislation can nevertheless have different effective legislation in the sense that firms
are more reluctant to lay off (and hire) workers in one of the countries. Second,
changes in the age structure of the population over time may have important
consequences. The maturing of the baby-boom generation in Europe can be one
explanation why a given set of institutions started to generate different labour-market
performance in the 1970s and 1980s from that of the 1950s and 1960s. For example,
the employment-protection legislation already in place in France, Italy and Spain may
have been less restrictive in the 1950s and 1960s than in the 1970s and 80s. We
conclude that labour-market rigidity is a function of the age-structure of the
population no less than of the nature of labour-market institutions.
Finally, there arises an interaction between the level and steepness of firing
costs, on the one hand, and the age of workers, on the other hand, in determining the
level of productivity at which firms start firing each worker. With low firing costs (or
firing costs that do not rise rapidly with age) the firing threshold is monotonically
rising in agethe more mature workers are the first to lose their jobs in a downturn.
But as the level of firing costs rises and/or they rise more steeply with age, the sign of
this relationship changes and the threshold becomes monotonically falling in agethe
young workers are the first to go if labour demand falls. We show the case of different
levels of firing costs in Figure 5 and different firing-costs profiles in Figure 6 below.
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2026323844505662
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Firing 
costs
Figure 5.The effect of age on the firing threshold with different firing costs. Age is equal to
(65-T_f). Other parameters: σ=0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, λ=0.05, w=1, and t=0.
2026323844505662
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T en u re
 S lop e
Firing  costs =  (T enure S lope)*W age*(45-T f)/96 .0
Figure 6.The 3-D diagram for the effect of age on the firing thresholds with different tenure
slopes (firing costs). Other parameters: σ=0.20, ρ=0.10, θ=0.7, η=0.02, λ=0.05, w=1, and
t=0.
VI. Conclusions
This paper has shown that the aggregate- and the distributional effects of employment-
protection legislation are likely to depend on the age structure of the population and
on the age of the workers affected. Such legislation is most effective in deterring the
dismissal of mature workers and, as a result, is more likely to lead firms to dismiss the
younger ones. Our explanation is independent of the productivity- and wage profiles
of workers and also independent of the type of pension schemes they have. The effect
arises for the sole reason that the value of the firing optionthat is a part of the
16
marginal cost of firingis decreasing in both the level of firing costs and in the age of
the worker.
Similarly, we can imagine an economy initially with only young workers. As
the workforce ages, the deterrent effect of employment-protection legislation on firms’
dismissal decisions (and also hiring decisions due to the expected cost of firing) is
likely to rise because the expected return from dismissing a worker is decreasing in his
age.9
Finally, our results have implications for any empirical work done to test the
employment effects of firing costs such as Lazear (1990), Scarpetta (1996), Elmeskov,
Martin and Scarpetta (1998), Nickell (1998), and DiTella and MacCulloch (1998). In
another paper (Chen and Zoega, 1999) we have shown how the employment effects of
firing costs depend on the nature of the stochastic process followed by
productivitytrend growth, variance, degree of mean reversionin addition to the
rate of interest and workers’ quit rates. Here we have shown that one also has to
control for the age-distribution of the workforce when testing for the effect of firing
costs on employment or unemployment. In Appendix E we show how this interaction
shows up in the data.
                                                
9 Note that these results would change if productivity had a mean-reverting tendency. We have assumed
this to be entirely absent.
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Appendix A:
When equation (8) in the text is set when time is equal to zero (t=0) and workers live
forever (T=∞), the equation (8) in the text is reduced to
( ) YYYY vYYvv 222
1
σ+η=λ+ρ .                                      (A1)
(A1) is a homogenous equidimensional linear differential equation and is easily
solvable. The solutions to (A1) are:
21
210
ββ YAYAv += ,                                          (A2)
where A1 and A2 are coefficients and β1 and β2 are the roots of the following
characteristic equation,
( ) ( ) 01
2
1 2
=λ+ρ−βη+−ββσ Y ,                                  (A3)
and β1 is positive and β2 is negative,
( ) 02
2
1
2
1
2
2
221 >σ
λ+ρ
+




−
σ
η
+
σ
η
−=β YY ,                      (A4)
( ) 02
2
1
2
1
2
2
222 <σ
λ+ρ
+




−
σ
η
−
σ
η
−=β YY .                      (A5)
The hiring and firing solutions for 0v  are
1
1
βYAvH =  for hiring option,                               (A6)
2
2
βYAvF =  for firing option.                               (A7)
These are equations (10.1) and (10.2) in the text respectively.
Appendix B:
Derivation of Equations (12) and (13)
We know that the if workers are expected to have infinite lives, the hiring and firing
options are 11
βYA  and 22
βYA  respectively. Thus, the first guess for the solutions to
equation (8) in the text would be
( ) ( )tYvYtYvG ,, β=                                            (B1)
Differentiating (B1) gives
Y
G
Y vYvYv
βββ += −1 ,
( ) YYYGYY vYvYvYv βββ βββ ++−= −− 12 21 ,
t
G
t vYv
β
= .
Substituting into equation (8) in the text gives
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) 021
2
1 22
=+−+++++− vvYvvvYYvv tYYYYY λρβηβββσ .
Rearranging gives
( ) ( ) 022
2
11
2
1
22
222
=




σ
+



	


σ
η
+β+σ+
 λ+ρ−βη+−ββσ βYvYvvYv tYYYYGY .  (B2)
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The first terms in the first bracket are equal to zero automatically due to the
characteristic equation of equation (A3) in the Appendix A.  With the assumption that
the solutions of options have the same components as the ones with infinite maturity,
βY , the functions, ( )tYv , , then follow a Convection-Diffusion type partial differential
equation:
022 22
2
=+




++ tY
Y
YY vYvvY
σσ
ηβ .                                 (B3)
It is time to get rid of the Y and Y2 terms. Let
,yeY =      − ∞ < < ∞y , 
1
2
1
2
2 2σ σ τt T= − ,
where T is a constant and Y  is the exercise price, firing or hiring costs. Then we get
v Yvy Y= ,  ,
2
YYYyy YvvYv +=  and 
1
2
2σ τv vt= − .
Substituting into (B3) gives
0
2
12 2 =−




−++ τ
σ
ηβ vvv yYyy .                                 (B4)
The boundary and conditions, equation (9.1) and (9.2) in the text become
( ) 0, =τ∞v ,  for firing options,                                (B5.1)
( ) 0, =τ∞−v ,  for hiring options,                               (B5.2)
Substituting the values of betas, 21  and ββ , of equations (A4) and (A5) in the
Appendix A into (B4) gives
02 =−+ τα vvv yyy , for hiring options,                         (B6)
02 =−− τα vvv yyy , for firing options,                         (B7)
where ( )2
2
2
2
2
1
σ
λ+ρ
+




−
σ
η
=α Y .
Hiring options
We can simplify (B6) by setting
τα2+= yx , τ=τ .
Note that τ  is the same as τ . To rewrite (B6) in terms of ( )τ,x  we use the chain rule
τττττ +α=τ+= vvvxvv xx 2 ,
xyxy vxvv == , and xxyy vv = .
Substituting into (B6) gives
τ= vvxx .                                                        (B8)
A new variable that depends only on x and τ  is often used to solve the above
partial differential equation:
τ
=ξ x ,                                                        (B9)
so that ( ) ( )ξ=τ uxv , . Differentiating shows that
( )ξξ
τ
−=τ '2
1 uv , ( )ξξ
τ
= ''1 uvxx .
Substituting into equation (B8) gives the following second-order ordinary differential
equation:
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( ) 0'
2
1'' =ξ+ξ uu ,  − ∞ < < ∞ξ ,                                  (B10)
The boundary condition of (B5.1) becomes the following equation:
( ) 0=∞−u , for hiring options,                                   (B11)
Separating the variables, (B10) becomes
( ) 41 2' ξ−=ξ eBu ,
where 1B  is unknown constant.  Integrating gives
( ) 141 2 CdseBu s +=ξ
ξ
∞−
− ,                                         (B12)
where 1C  is an unknown constant. Applying the boundary condition for hiring options
(B11) gives
( ) 0lim 1 ==ξ
−∞→ξ
Cu .
Substituting into (B12) gives
( )
ξ
∞−
−
=ξ dseBu s 41 2 .
It is convenient to make the change of variable s = 2ϖ , so that
( )
ξ
∞−
ϖ−
ξ
∞−
ϖ− ϖ
π
=ϖ=ξ
2
2
1
2
2
1
22
2
12 deAdeBu .                     (B13)
where π= 211 BA . Substituting (B13) into (B1) and using the facts of ,
yeY =
1
2
1
2
2 2σ σ τt T= − ,  τα2+= yx , and τ=τ  gives the hiring options vH
G ,
( ) ( )11 1, dNYAtYvGH β= ,                                      (B14)
where 
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
+
+




−−+
=
σ
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ 2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1ln
 and ( ) ,
2
1 22
∞−
ϖ− ϖ
π
=
d
dedN .
Firing options
In a similar way, we can obtain the firing options. We can simplify (B7) by setting
τα−= 2yx  and τ=τ .
τ= vvxx .                                                   (B15)
A new variable 
τ
=ξ x  is used to solve the above partial differential equation so that
( ) ( )ξ=τ uxv , .  Differentiating and substituting into (B15) gives the following simple
second order ordinary differential equation:
( ) 0'
2
1'' =ξ+ξ uu ,   − ∞ < < ∞ξ .
Separating the variables, the above equation becomes
( ) 42 2' ξ−=ξ eBu ,
where 2B  is unknown constant. Integrating gives
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( ) 242 2 AdseBu s +=
∞−
−
ξ
ξ ,                                        (B16)
where 2A  is an unknown constant. The boundary condition of (B5.2) becomes the
following equation:
( ) 0=∞u ,     for firing options,                                  (B17)
Applying the boundary condition for hiring options (B16) gives
( )
π
==+π=ξ
∞→ξ 2
02lim 2222
ABABu .
Substituting into (B16) gives
( ) 


π
−=ξ
ξ
∞−
− dseAu s 42
2
2
11 .
It is convenient to make the change of variable s = 2ϖ , so that
( )
ξ−
∞−
ϖ−
∞
ξ
ϖ−
ξ
∞−
ϖ− ϖ
π
=ϖ
π
=





ϖ
π
−=ξ
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
2
222
2
1
2
1
2
11 deAdeAdeAu .
Thus, the firing options vH
G  becomes
( ) ( )22 2, dNYAtYvGF −= β ,                                      (B18)
where 
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
+
+




−−−
=
σ
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1ln
 and ( ) ,
2
1 22
∞−
ϖ− ϖ
π
=
d
dedN .
Appendix C:
Derivation of Equations (20) and (21)
By definition,
( ) ,
2
1 22
∞−
ϖ− ϖ
π
=
d
dedN  ( ) 10 ≤≤ dN
where
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
+
+




−−+
=
σ
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ 2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1ln
,
( ) ( )
tT
tTY
d
Y
−
+
+




−−−
=
σ
σ
λρ
σ
η
σ 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1ln
.
Differentiation of the integral, N(d), involves a parameter. Suppose a function
( ) ( )
( )
( )
ϕ x f x s ds
a x
b x
= , ,                                            (C1)
where f is such that the integration cannot be effected analytically. Using calculus
gives
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ϕ ∂ ∂x a x
b x
x xx
f x s
x
ds f x b x b x f x a x a x= + −
,
, , .               (C2)
Applying (C2) to the differentiation of ( )1dN and ( )2dN −  gives
21
( )
( )[ ]
( )
( )tTY
edN
tT
tTY
Y
−
=
−
−+−
πσ
σ
ασ
2
2
22
2
ln
1 ,                                      (C3)
( )
( )[ ]
( )
( )tTY
edN
tT
tTY
Y
−
−=−
−
−+−−
πσ
σ
ασ
2
2
22
2
ln
2 .                                (C4)
where ( )2
2
2
2
2
1
σ
λρ
σ
η
α
+
+




−=
Y .
Appendix D
Equation (8) in the text can be solved numerically by finite different method. To
compare the numerical results of finite different method with the analytical solutions
in the Appendix C, we use the simple and robust explicit finite difference method,
which is widely used in the pricing of derivatives.
               For firing options with maturity T, the boundary condition is ( ) 0, =∞ tvG
and ( ) ( )[ ]0,max,0 FbwaYtvG −−−= , where a = ( ) ( )( ) ( )YTt YY ee ηλρηλρηλρ −+− −+−−+− ,
( ) ( )( ) ( )λ+ρ−= λ+ρ−λ+ρ− Tt eeb , and F the firing costs. The terminal condition (in the
programme, calculated from T to 0) is ( ) 0, =TYf . The condition of
( ) ( )[ ]GG vFbwaYtYv ,max, −−−=  is checked for every t since it is a free-boundary
condition in a sense that the firing option can be exercised at any time.
Equation (8) in the text,
( ) GtGYYGYYG vvYYvv +σ+η=λ+ρ 222
1 ,                                (D1)
can be approximated by the following grids.10 Let ( ) jiG vYtv ,, ≡ ,
Y
vv
Y
v jijiG
∆
−
=
∂
∂
−+++
2
1,11,1
2
,11,11,1
2
2 2
Y
vvv
Y
v jijijiG
∆
−+
=
∂
∂ +−+++
t
vv
t
v jijiG
∆
−
=
∂
∂ + ,,1
Substituting into (D1) gives
( ) jijijiji
jiji
Y
jiji
v
Y
vvv
Sj
Y
vv
Yj
t
vv
,2
,11,11,1222
1,11,1,,1
2
2
1                    
2
λρσ
η
+=





∆
−+
∆+







∆
−
∆+
∆
−
+−+++
−++++
           (D2)
Rearranging gives
1,1
*
,1
*
1,1
*
, +++−+ ++= jijjijjijji vcvbvav                                    (D3)
where
( )



 ∆+∆−
∆++
= tjtj
t
a Yj
22*
2
1
2
1
1
1
σηλρ
                                                
10 For a similar algorithm in derivative pricing, see Brennan and Schwartz (1978).
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( ) ( )tjtb j ∆−∆++= 22* 11
1
σλρ
( )



 ∆+∆
∆++
= tjtj
t
c Yj
22*
2
1
2
1
1
1
σηλρ
The firing thresholds calculated from above algorithm are shown in figure D1,
together with the ones in figure 1. The results show that the analytical solutions are
good approximations to the real thresholds.
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Explicit finite difference method
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F=5
Figure D1. The comparison of explicit finite difference method and numerical
approximations. All parameters are the same as in figure 1 in the text.
Appendix E
Following Nickell (1998) we estimate an equation where the dependent variable is
average unemployment in 1983-1988 and 1989-1994 for 19 OECD countries.11 The
explanatory variables include the unemployment-benefit replacement ratio (replace),
the maximum duration of benefits (duration), union density (unden), union coverage
(uncov), union coordination (uncoord), employer coordination (emcoord), a measure
of active labour-market policies (labexp), the average change in the inflation rate and
a measure of employment protection (epl).
The first two columns in the table below show the standard results when we do not
allow for any interaction with the age structure of the population. The sign and
significance of all variables is as expected. We note that epl has an insignificant
coefficient. We then add the share of the labour force between the ages of 15 and 19
(age) as an interaction term with the epl in columns 3 and 4. The coefficients are not
much affected apart from the constant term and the coefficient of epl. The effect of epl
becomes stronger when we include the share of the labour force between the ages of
15 and 24. This is shown in the last two columns.
                                                
11 We are grateful to Stephen Nickell for providing us with the data.
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Table 2.  Unemployment equations
No interaction terms Age (15-19) as
interaction term
Age (15-24) as
interaction term
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient        t-ratio
      C   6.29 1.5 -7.82 -0.8 -26.50 -2.4
      Dummy (89-94)   7.61 1.8 -6.54 -0.7 -24.29 -2.3
      Replace   0.10 4.2  0.12  4.8   0.14  6.2
      Duration   0.70 2.1  0.58  1.7   0.71  2.4
      Density   0.03 0.8  0.03  0.6   0.06  1.7
      Uncoord.  -2.12 2.0 -2.21 -2.1  -2.74 -3.0
      Emcoord  -3.77 4.2 -4.01 -4.5  -4.29 -5.4
      Labexp  -0.07 1.9 -0.10 -2.4  -0.11 -3.0
      ∆inflation  -1.01 1.5 -1.45 -2.1  -1.47 -2.4
      Uncov   3.16 2.7  3.07  2.6   3.07  2.8
      Epl   0.49 0.7 -2.03 -0.3 -34.92 -1.9
      Age (15-19)  -0.42 1.4  0.74  1.0   1.02  2.6
      Epl*age  1.09  0.5   3.62  2.3
      Epl*age2 -0.07 -0.7  -0.09 -2.5
      Observations: 38 R2 DW
      Period: 83-88 0.87 2.03
      Period: 89-94       0.49 1.73
In the last two regressions, the effect of epl is significant and a function of the age
structure. This function is shown in the following figure when we use the age group
15-24.
When the share of the labour force between 15 and 24 is less than 26%, the effect of
the epl on unemployment is positivegreater epl gives higher unemploymentwhile
the converse is true when the share is higher than 26%. We conclude that when the
effect of epl on unemployment is allowed to depend on the age structure of the labour
force, its effect becomes statistically significant.
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